Gendered virtues: can virtue ethics provide an adequate guide to action in the context of gender oppression?
Drawing on ideas from feminist ethics and care ethics, this paper aims to demonstrate that deontological moral theories have traditionally excluded women by using masculine gendered terminology. It is further shown that whilst virtue ethics encounters the same issues by favouring 'masculine' virtues, it has the theoretical capability to incorporate a feminist/care approach to ethics and that moreover, these approaches ought to be combined if we are to continue to develop an adequate approach to morality.
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